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I 
What' and Why Are S t r i k e s ?  
. .. . . 
John R: Commons, . t h e  g r e a t  Amerfcan t h e o r i s t  of c o l - l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  had 
. . 
two fundamental i n s i g h t s  i n t o  s t r i k e  a c t i ' v i t y ,  "People may ques t ion , "  he wrote 
i n  his,.summfng-up volume., "why i t  i s  t h a t  even h igh  wage workers go ou t  on s t rTke ,  
I 
' .  and'employe-rs o f t e n  t h i n k  t h a t  by o f f e r i n g  workers s t i l l  h ighe r  wages they  can 
induce them t o  s t a y  a t  work o r  win them back t o  work. But what t he  union wants 
i s  a  hea r ing  f o r  each i n d i v i d u a l  be fo re  he i s  f i r e d ,  o r  w h e n h e  a l l e g e s  t h a t  he has  
been d i sc r imina ted  a g a i n s t .  This  i s  the  most t h a t  t h e  members mean by ' r ecogn i t i on  
of t h e  u n i o n l . " l  A s  a  l i f e l o n g  member of t h e  typographica l  workers '  union, and 
an i n c e s s a n t  promoter of i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ba rga in ing ,  Commons developed 
a  s t r d n g  sense  6 f .  t h e  n e c e s s i t y ,  of.  guarantees  f o r  worker c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  a t  t he  
same' time1 a s  he hoped t o  s t a b i l i z e  and con ta in  worker-management s t r u g g l e s .  Yet 
Commons h s o  had t h i s  i n s i g h t :  "The ques t ion  of power i s  t h e  fundamental ques t ion  
of c l a s s  war, o r  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e ,  breaking o u t  i n  s t r i k e s ,  l ockou t s ,  and even 
i n  . m i l i t a r y  r e v o l u t i o n s .  Two i n s i g h t s ,  then , .  converging i n f o  one.: t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o n f l i c t  concerns t h e  r i .gh ts  of workers and employers,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  s t r i c t l y  
economic r e t u r n  workers r e c e i v e  f o r  ' t h e i r  l a b o r .  
I f  t h e  double i n s i g h t  now seems obvious,  t h a t  i s  n o t  because a l l  s t uden t s  
%. of I n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l f c t  t ake  i t  f o r  gran ted .  I?oll6wing P.K. ~ d i 7 i r . d ~ ;  ,we  might make 
a  rough d i s t i n c t i o n  among t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e  views of. i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t :  a s  p r o t e s t ,  
a s  power s t r u g g l e ,  and a s  - i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  The a n a l y s i s  of s t r i k e s  and 
3 
' .  r e l a t e d  a c t i o n s  as '  p r o t e s t ,  typifi 'ed by Jeremy B r e c h e r , ' ~  S t r i k e ! :  The True His tory  
. . 
' o f  Mass Insurgence i n  America from 1877 t o  t h e  P r e s e n t ,  p r e s e n t s  them a s  r e l a t i v e l y  
d i r e c t  express ions  bf t h e  cur=ent  l e v e l  and c h a r a c t e r  of  d i scon ten t  amdig workdrs. 
4 .  
The a n a l y s l s  of flower s t r u g g l e ,  i l l u s t r a t e d  by Walter .Korp i l s  The Working Class  in. 
Welfare Capital ism, .  p o r t r a y s  a  continuous compet'ition .among workers,  managers, and 
o f f i c i a l s ,  i n  which s t r i k e s  and lockou t s  become cont ingent  outcomes of 
a much l a r g e r  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s .    he a n a l y s i s  of i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  accep t s  
5 
the  fdea  of f n t e r a c t i o n  ( a s  opposed t o  d i r e c t  exp res s ion  o f . o n e  s i d e ' s  d i s c o n t e n t ) ,  
I 
b u t  s t r e s s e s  the  containment of workers '  and managers' demands w i t h i n  
~. 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms ' t ha t  a), vary  s t r o n g . 1 ~  from one time, i n d u s t r y ,  o r  p i a c e  
t o  ano the r ,  b )  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  shape t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  and con ten t  of i n d u s t r i a l  
c o n f l i c t ;  Hugh Clegg's  Trade Unionism Under C o l l e c t i v e  Bargaining o f f e r s  a  
r e c e n t  ve r s ion  of i n d u s t r i a l - r e l a t i o n s  a n a l y s i s .  P.K. Edwards' S t r i k e s  i n  t he  
6 
United S t a t e s  b u i l d s  d i r e c t l y  on Clegg's  work. Speaking very  schemat ica l ly ,  
p ro fe s  t ' t h e o r i s t s  . t e n d  t o  r e j e c t  Commons' f i r s t  i n s i g h t  . ( t h a t  workers r e g u l a r l y  
seek t o  s t a b i l i z e  and l e g i t i m i z e  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  vo ice  i n  t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n  wi th  
management and government) and -  to. s t r e s s  t h e  second ( t h a t .  s t r i k e s  s p r i n g  from 
s t r u g g l e s '  f o r  power). Power-struggle t h e o r i s t s  tend  t o  give. t he  two i n s i g h t s  
equal  weight .  And i n d u s t r i a l - r e l a t i o n s  t h e o r i s t s  tend t o  s t r e s s  t he  f i r s t ,  whi le  
be ing  a t  , l e a s t  dubious about  t h e  second. Although t h e  i n d u s t r i a l - r e l a t i o n s  
school  can c la im t h e  m o s t  d i r e c t  l i n e  of descen t  from Commons v i a  S e l i g  Perlman 
and o t h e r  commons s t u d e n t s ,  r e c e n t  gene ra t ions  of t h a t  school  have l e f t  one s i d e  
of , t h e  Commons h e r i t a g e  r e l a t i v e l y  undeveloped. 
Unsurpr i s ingly ,  t h e  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e  views of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  l e a d  t o  
somewhat d i f f e r e n t  ways of grouping and i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  a v a i l a b l e . e v i d e n c e .  Two 
choices  Ioom e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e :  genera l  v s .  p a r t i c u l a r ,  broad v s .  narrow. By no 
means do thep . r educe  t o  t h e  same choice.  The cho ice  between genera l  and p a r t i c u l a r  
runs  l i k e  t h i s :  I f  we t r e a t  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n f l i c t s  as man i fe s t a t ions  of a  gene ra l ,  
r e g u l a r  phenomenon, we ga in  t h e  advantages of ready comparison and acces s  t o  
we l l - s t a t ed  modeis t h a t  h a v e ' a l r e a d y  s tood t h e  t e s t  of con f ron ta t ion  wi th  hard 
evidence,  bu t  run t h e  r i s k  t h a t  t h e  models hide '  qu i t e . . i nappropr i a t e  assumptions 
about  t he  con tex t s  i n  which t h e  c o n f l i c t s ' o c c u r .  . I f ,  on t h e  o the r  hand; we read 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n f l f c t s  a s  s2gns of t h e  c o n d i t i o n s . c u r r e n t l y  a f f e c t i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  
s e t s  of 'managers .and workers,  we ,ga in  knowledge of those cond i t i ons  a t  t h e  r i s k  
of mis tak ing  very  gene ra l  f e a t u r e s  of i n d L s t r i a 1  con£ l i c t  f o r  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of 
t he  s i t u a t i o n s  a t  hand. We might hope, f o  be' s u r e ,  t o  d i scove r  t h e  ' i dea l  
equat ion  . . t h a t  s imultanebusly summarize's the  gene ra l -  laws of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  
and - s t a t e s  t h e  . p r i n c i p l e s  of v a r i a t i o n .  I* . the'  meantime, p r o t e s t  t h e o r i s t s  
more o f t e n  g ive  a  p a r t i c u l a r  reading  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  i n s t a n c e s  o f . c o n f l i c t ,  
. . !  
scanning them f o r  news of problems and gr ievances  he re  'and now, wh i l e  power-struggle . 
t h e o r i s t s  more f r e q u e n t l y  aim a t  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  of g e n e r a l i t y ,  and i n d u s t r i a l -  
. . 
r e l a t i o n s  t h e o r i s t s ,  on t h e  average ,  f i n d  themselves i n  between. 
A s  f o r  t h e  choice  between broad .and narrow, i t  fo l lows  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  s t r i k e  i s  o*ly one form of '  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t .  -- .one whose ve ry  d e f i n i t i o n  
i n  any time a n d . p l a c e  i s - a  r e s u l t  of prev ious  s t r u g g l e s  and . admin i s t r a t i ve  
. . 
- p r a c t i c e s . .  Where should we draw t h e  l i n e s  among absenteeism, shop-f loor  d. isputes ,  
... I 
sabotage, '  l ockou t s ,  and s t r ' i k e s  ~ t r f c t o .  .sknsu? I f  we choose a  . b road .  concept ion 
of . i ' n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , w e  ga in  t h e  advantage o f  examining t h e  i n t e r p l a y  among. 
. .. . 
d i f f e r e n t  forms of s t r u g g l e  a t  t h e  c o s t  of t ak ing  on t h e  s tudy  of phenomena f o r  
which t h e  e v i d e n c e . i s  fragmentary and o f t e n  i n t r a c t a b l e .  I f  we choose a  narrow 
conception (which u s u a l l y  means concent ra t ing  on s t r i k e s  a s  c u r r e n t l y  def ined  
and r eco rded) , .we  ga in  t h e  advantage of c r i s p ,  comparable, abundant evidence a t  
t he  c o s t  of being vu lne rab le  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  . admin i s t r a t i ve  p r a c t i c e  and of 
sometimes i n t e r p r e t i n g  s h i f t s  %n t h e  forms o r  l o c i  of c o n f l i c t  a s  changes i n .  : 
t h e  o v e r a l l '  l e v e l  of con£ l i c t  . , This time p r o t e s t  and power-struggle t h e o r i s t s  
commonly group toge the r  a t  t h e  broad end of t h e ' r a n g e ,  i n s i s t i n g  on the  examination. 
. . 
. . . . of s e v e r a l  d ~ f f e r e n t  forms ,of  c o n f l i c t ,  while  i n d u s t r i a l - r e l a t i o n s  t h e o r i s t s  
. . 
remain'more w i l l i n g ,  o n ' t h e  whole, t o  concen t r a t e  on s t r i k e s  a s  such. 
~ r o t ' e s t  , power-struggle,  and i n d u s t r i a l - r e i a t i o n s  views of i n d u s t r i a l  . . . 
. . 
c o n f l i c t  a l l  have ped$grees s t r e t c h i n g  back i n t o  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  century .  General 
. . 
h i s t o r i e s  of t he  l a b o r  movement, for 'example,  u s u a l l y  i nco rpora t e  a .  p r o t e s t  
interpretation of str.ikes and other forms of .industrial conflict. Recurrent 
. .. 
studies of industrial con£ lict as- a social problem, on the other hand,' usually 
adopt an industrial-relations perspective,'with its implication ,that different 
, institutions for conflict management could make industrial conflict less likely, 
or 'at least less costly. until. recently, however, power-struggle interpretations 
have been relatively unpbpular among professional students of industrial conflict. 
Over the last decade or so, the balance has changed. Partly as a result 
. . 
of the intellectual .ferment surrounding the movements .of' 1968 and partly as a 
concomitant of the. renekl of Marxist work on industrial processes, - power-struggl-e 
treatments of industrial conflict have flourished. Michelle Perrot's Les ouvriers 
en gr\eve, the shorter-  ill^ Strikes' in France, Walter Kprpi' s Working Class in 
I Welfare Capitalism, James Cronin's Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain and 
Douglas Hibbs' multiple essays on the.evolution of industrial conflict in western 
. . 
countries exemplify the power-struggle renaissance. Although these works .differ 
7 
considerably from one another -- and, indeed, often take aim at one another -- 
they have in common an urge to generalization, a relatively broad conception of 
industrial conflict, a view of strikes as contingent out'comes of wider struggles, 
and an inclination to assign .national structures of power:'a~good deal of 
I 
significance in the shaping of strikes and other forms of industrial con£ lict. : 
P.K. Edwards on- American Strikes 
P.K. Edwards. thtnks of many of the recent authors as advocates of organtza- 
tFonal-politi.ca1 models. They. are organizational, as he sees it, in stressing 
worker organization as a prerequisite to worker collective action. They are 
political in claiming that strike activity has significant connections with . . 
national struggles for .power. Edwards offers ~ i b b s ,  Korpi, and Shorter-Tilly 
as examples, and takes the Shorter-Tilly analysi.s of French strike activity as 
i / . 5 .  
I . . 
. . 
his chief object of scrutiny. He sdlt-c&nsciously 'places himself at a 
distance from these power-struggle analyses, but not so far away that he 
loses all their insights. 
I Exactly how far Edwards stands from the organizational-political models 
remains. &clear, for? two reasons. ~irst , he often turns from the sustained 
. . 
critique of the Shorter-Tilly argument to tussle with another group of 
. . 
antagonists: theories of institutionalization, which suggest that with mature 
industrialism. and adequate mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, strikes. 
calm down, lose significance, become less costly, or even wither away. Second, 
while his most general statements establish a sharp separation from the Shorter- 
Tilly position, his analyses of particular features of American strike activity 
I frequ&ntly converge with those of Shorter and Tilly. Nevertheless, over the 
, . 
book' as a whole Edwards takes a position noticeably closer to theindustrial- 
relations school (and noticeably farther from the protest school) than Shorter, 
Tilly, and their confreres. As opposed to national politics, he argues the 
importance of job-control issues in American strikes. As opposed to unionization 
and worker organization in general, he argues the significance of the special 
mechanisms for labor relations American workers, managers, and government officials 
created. 
Edwards portrays his.book as an attempt to answer "one large question: how , .  . 
and' why has the~merican strike picture altered during the enormous industrial 
. . 
and institutional.changes of the past century?" How, then, does-he propose to 
8 
answer that large question? 
. . 
Edwards centers his work on the study o'f almost one hundi-kd years of 
. . 
official strike statistics, 'as collected and published by the United States 
Bureau of bibor Statistics. His empirical8 results come not only from the analysis 
. . 
I 
.of standard 'strike indicators --'number of strikes, number of workers involved 
. . 
! 
and number of hours lost. -- but.on a variety of other strike measures, such as 
trade 'union involvement in strikes, .results of strikes, strikes by issue, . . official 
vs. wildcat.strikes, number of establishments struck, and so on.. . He of.ten- uses 
the data in ingenious, insightful ways. 
. . 
His quantitative.' method consists of straight£ obard tabdations, simple 
. . 
correlations, and standard slngle-equatfon econometric analyses . . .  In theBe 
respects he stays a cautious distance behind the current state of the art 
I 
among quantitative analysts of industrial conflict. That quantitative reticence 
makes his presentation relatively easy to follow. As we shall see later, it 
also involves him in unnecessary risks of error, and reduces the comparability 
o'f his re-sults with those of other investigators. 
What are those 'results? As Edwards reads them, four main findings emerge 
from ,the empirical analyses : 
1; Unlike the experience of many other' countries, the ."shape1' .of 
American strikes (i.e. the particular configuration of frequency, size, and 
duration at any point in time) shows no significant long-term change over 
the ias t cefitury . 
. . . . 
. '  - 2 .  ~conomic factors and the business cycle affect strike activity,' but 
. . 
' 
not to the -extent ..that is generally. believed. 




. . . . 4 .  Bargaining structure has a sttong effect upon strike activity. 
. I. 
If these findings hold as stated, they chailenge ideas of 'the "institutionalization" 
of strikes, raise doubts about protest and' power-struggle models of industrial 
conflict, and add weight to industrial-relations models. For these reasons, and 
a 
for the most comprehensive description of American strike patterns published 
so far, Strikes in the United States deserves close attention. 
Edwards Close Up 
Several features of Edwards' book stand up well to close scrutiny. 
First, it is a welcome addition to the small number of extensive, longitudinal, 
quantitative studies of industrial conflict, which are especially rare for American 
strikes. The last comprehensive investigation of American strikes dates back to 
I 
Griffin's study, over forty years old.9 Large-scale studies of single countries 
(such as Edwards for the United States, Shorter/Tilly for France, Cronin and 
Knowles for the United Kingdom) should eventually make cross-national understanding 
of strikes more meaningf~l.~~ 
Second, the work attempts to bring the more qualitative evidence of case 
studies to bear on the main arguments. Those case studies are especially rich 
and abundant for the United States. No other general work has made such extensive 
use of this large body of literature; it never seems to find its way into the 
bibliographies.of quantitative investigations of industrial conflict. That is 
a plty , not only because the case studies pro;ide another perspective on strikes, 
but also because they offer the means of validating the measures and interpreting 
.the results of q.uantitative analyses spanning hundreds or thousands of events. 
. . 
Third, most investigations of strike activity -- quantitative accounts . 
more than the rest -- deal with the decision to strike and the decision to stop 
striking almost exclusively from the workers' side. Edwards properly portrays 
s t r i k e s  a s  outcomes o£ t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among workers ,  emplqyers,  and 
. < 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of governments. 
. . . . 
-, F i n a l l y ,  . . ~ d w a r d s  makes a  convincing case' f o r  - t h e  r o l e  o f  ba rga in ing  
I . - 
' s t r u c t u r e  i n  t he  p a t t e r n  of s t r i k e s .  H i s  work makes one of  t h e  few a t t empt s '  
. ?  
s o  f a r  t o  f o l l o w  up s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  on Clegg' s seminal  ' i d e a s .  concerning t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ? t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  .. and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  bargairi ing. ' . 
A l l ,  however, i s  n o t  'admirable  i n  ~ d w a r d s '  work, 
, F i t s t ,  t h e  q u a l i t y  of Edwards1 methods does n o t  always. Keep pace w i th  h i s  
. . 
g r a s p o f  t h e o r i e s  .-- o t h e r  peop le l ' s  and h i s  own. One can ha rd ly  escape  f e e l i n g s  
of uneas iness  about  some of t h e  econometric work: t h e  u se  of unorthodox measures , 
I 
such a s  Edwards1 "trough" and "peak" i n d i c a t o r s  o f  t he  bus ines s  c y c l e ;  t h e  u s e  of 
. . .  
an &lagged , r e a l  wage v a r i a b l e  i n s t e a d  of t h e  u s u a l  d i s t r i b u t e d - l a g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
i n  Edwards' 'vergion of t h e  Ashenfe. l ter  and Johnson model; t h e  l a c k  of  a  s t a t e d  
r a t i d n a l e  for .  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  choice  o f '  sample peri 'ods (1881-19.10, 1900-1939, and 
. . 
1946-1972 1 i n  ' t h e  most gene ra l  t2me-series aha lyses  ; t h e  unexplained f l u c t u a t i o n  
1 .  
Tn t h e  p e r i o d i z a t i o n  from one t a b l e  t o  t h e  nex t  ( s e e ,  e . g . ,  t a b l e  3 .4 ) ;  t h e  l a c k  
of correspondence between t h e s e  v a r i o u s  p e r i o d i z a t i o n s  and t h e  g e n e r a l  t ime tab l e  
proposed i n  t h e  bookl.s t a b l e  of c o n t e n t s ;  t h e  p re sen t a t3on  of zero,-order c o r r e l a t i o n s  
between r a t i o  v a r i a b l e s w i t h  common terms ( e , g .  t a b l e s  3 , 1 ,  3 .3 ,  3.41, d e s p i t e  
. Edwards1 own cau t ions  aga?ns t  j u s t  such p r a c t i c e s .  I n  sound. econometric , . 
11 
p r a c t i c e ,  an. i n v e s t ' i g a t o r  who wan.ts simultane'ously t'o innovate  and t o  compare 
c o n d l c t s  t h e  c r u c i a l  a n a l y s e s  . f n  bo th  t h e  "oldi1 way and t h e  "new", . t hus  
a  s o l i d  br fdge  b w k  t o  t h e  p rev ious  ana lyses  he means t o  r e f u t e ,  h c o r p o r a t e ,  
. . or  improve. 
, , 
Such small-technical points accumulate 'to a large methodological point: 
. . we accept and reject .theories on the basis of empirical evidence treated in 
. . 
comparable ways. Without competent technical work and comparable treatments of 
8 : 
. .the evidence, we ios@ the .ability to decide whether discrepancies between the 
, . ! 
results of different investigators result from technica1,errors-, true variations 
. . 
from one case to .another, or the sup.eriority of one theory to another. 
-Here is one'example. Edwards uses his unorthodox economic indicators-- 
the "trough" and "peak" variable and the unlagged real wage -- to gauge the 
contribution of business cycle theories to the understanding of strikes. Since 
his conclusion is negative, how much of the discrepancy between Edwards' findings 
and those of previous business-cycle advocates results from his use of those 
I 
particular variables? 
The choice of sample periods can also be critical. If institutional 
arrangements and bargaining structure play such a significant role, and if 
"the year 1934 was a turning point" in this process of institutionalization, 
12 
why lump together in the same analysis periods as different as the 1920s and 
the 1930s? In his own analysis of American strike data, Romagnoli found marked 
differences between the two periods. At a minimum, we might have expected 
13 
Edwards to introduce a beforelafter dummy variable to capture the effect of 
the proposed turning point. 
For these reasons and others, Edwards' analyses never addre'ss directly 
. . 
. . . . 
the discrepancies'between his findings and those of ostensibly similar studies, 
- .  
for example the Ashenf elter-Johnson analysis. The discrepancies leave a nagging, 
. . . . 
doubt: Do they. really mean..,that he structure of conflict has changed, or .could 
* 
they be due simply to differences in the choice of measures and- specifications'? 
Sometimes t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  s e t  o n e o f . ' ~ d w a r d s '  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  
. . 
anoth'er.. I t  i s  n o t  always c l e a r  f r o m , h i s  work which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  he  p r e f e r s .  
i .  
He d e c l a r e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  " the  view t h a t  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  depend on t h e  
. . 
. bus ines s  c y c l e  has  won r a t h e r  too  ea sy -accep tance . "  Statements  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  . . 4 . - 
? 
appear throughout t h e  book. Example: "One cannot  r e j e c t  t h e  hypothes i s  t h a t  
1.evels of economic a c t i v i t y  a r e  adequate  p-redi.ctors of t h e  r a t e .  of s t r i k e .  . 
a c t i v i t y "  f o r  the'1900-1939 and 1946-1972 pe r iods .  Again':. "During t h e  1930s 
15  
a s  much a s  a t  o t h e r  t imes ,  s t r i k e ,  a c t i v i t y  was r e l a t e d  t o  economic cond i t i ons . "  
16 
. . 
F i n a l l y : .  ' ' I d e n t i f i a b l e  economic f a c t o r s  l a y  behind t h e  rise i n  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y "  
f o r  t h e  1962-1972 per iod  .Since every one of  t h e s e  s t a t emen t s  d e s c r i b e s  a 
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t ime- se r i e s  a n a l y s i s ,  they  amount t o  d e c l a r a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  c y c l e ,  a s  
I 
u s u a l l y  understood by a n a l y s t s  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t ,  had s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  
on s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  i n  1900-1939, t h e  1930s, 1946-1972, and 1962-1972. I n  s h o r t ,  
over  t h e  main pe r iods  Edwards s i n g l e s  o u t  f o r  s t udy .  
One l a s t  example. "The f a i l u r e  of union d e n s i t y , "  w r i t e s  Edwards, " to  
o p e r a t e  s i g n i i i c a n t l y '  :in combination w?th t h e  niore gene ra l  economic v a r i a b l e s  
c a s t s  very  g r e a t  doubt on t h e  view t h a t  & g a n i z a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  must be  given . . . 
an independent r o l e  i n  t h e  de t e rmina t ion  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y . "  Y e t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
1 8  
' 
r e g r e s s i o n  analyse.s- u se  s t r i k e  frequency a l o n e  a s  t h e i r  dependent. v a r i a b l e .  
S t r i k e  a n a l y s t s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y a w a r e  t h a t  u n i o n i z a t i o n  -is r e l a t e d  t o t h e  number 
of workers involved i n  s t r i k e s  r a t h e r  than t o  t h e i r  sheer  f requency.  Elsewhere, 
Edwards recommends t h a t  ve  "explore  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  same model i n  exp la in ing  
d i f f e r e n t  f e a t u r e s  of s t r i k e s ,  whi le  bear ing  i n  mind t h a t  s t r i k e  frequency and . 
worker ihvolvement may be in f luenced  by d i f f e r e n t  8 f a c t o r s ,  " Why, t hen ,  doesn! t 
19 
he p r e s e n t  r e s u l t s  concerning d u r a t i o n ,  person-days and,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  s i z e ?  
. . 
Once aga in  a major conc lus ion  Edwards draws from h i s  a n a l y s i s  appea r s  t o  come 
from a  p a r t  i d . ,  somewhat i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  kon f r&n ta t ion  between argument and 
evidence.  . . 
s t r i k e s .  and P o l i t i c s  
I .  
Simi l a r .  d i f f i c u l t i e s  dog Edwards' r e j e c t i o n  of  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l - p o l i t i c a l  
? 
models of . i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t :  ."On empi r i ca l  a s  w e l l  a s  on methodological  
grounds . . . a  ' p o l i t i c a l '  i n t e r p r e t a t . i o n  of American s t r i k e s  cannot  be  advanced 
. . 
f o r  any per iod '  s i n c e  1881,;" Since Edwards d i r e c t s  h i s  main f i re  a t  t h e  work of 
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Shor t e r  and ~ i l l y ,  l e t  u s  be  c l e a r  what Shor t e r  and T i l l y  c l a imed . .  The i r  
most g e n e r a l  s t a t emen t  r a n  l i k e  t h i s :  
I n  t h e  long  run ,  changes i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of p roduct ion ,  i nc lud ing  
t h e  e f f e c t s  of t e c h n i c a l  innovat ions  on work r o u t i n e s  and supe rv i s ion ,  
I 
shape both  (a )  t h e  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  work s i t u a t i o n  which workers s eek  t o  
. improve, e. l imiiiate o r  c o n t r o l  and (b) t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  
a f f e c t i n g  c o l l e c t f v e  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of workers and of  managers. 
P r o s p e r i t y ,  governmental t o l e r a t i o n  and t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  of  t h e i r  opponents 
a l l  promote c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by t h e  one p a r t y  and t h e  o t h e r .  Largely 
a s ' a  r e s u l t  of . t h e i r  own c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  . . . organized groups of workers 
a c q u l r e  p l a c e s  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of power. The s t r i k e  becomes the  
p r i n c i p a l  means by wh ich . those  organized groups d i s p l a y  t h e i r  s t r e n g t h  ; 
. . and- e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  o t h e r  -chief p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n - t h e  power. s t r u c t u r e  --' 
. . 
. '. both e m p l o y e ~ s  and t h e  government. A s  a  consequence of t h e s e  m u l t i p l e  long- 
. . 
run changes,  s t r i k e s  become more f r equen t  and l a r g e r  i n  s c a l e , .  t h e i r  
respons iveness  t o  changes i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  of l abo r  . . . 
l n c r e a s e s  and acquiescence o r  even c o l l a b o r a t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of government' 
. 
o f f i c i a l s  p l a y s  a growing part i n  t h e  outcome of s t r i k e s .  S t r i k e s  a r e  power 
s t r u g g l e s ;  o r g ~ n i z e d  workers u se  what power they have .to economic advantage,  
. . 
of course ;  but .  s t r i k e s  expand a s  workers o rgan ize  and- a s  t h e i r  o rgan iza t ions  
' a c q u i r e  i n c r e a s i n g  s t a k e s  i n  t he  n a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of power 21 . 
That: i s  what s t ~ d r t e r  and   ill^ c a l l e d  t h e i r  " p o l i t i c a l "  i n t e r p r e t a t i q n  .of 
s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y .  On t h e  b a s i s  of e x t e n s i v e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  ana lyses ,  they . 
clai'med t o  have ma'de a  reasonable  case  fo.r, such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of French. 
s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  .'from 1830 t o  1968. Then they  ' de sc r ibed  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of 
I . . 
s t r i k e  shapes -- s i z e ,  d u r a t i o n ,  and' frequ'ency -- i n  a number of wes te rn  
c o u n t r i e s  . . from 1900 onward, and specu la t ed  on t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  
. . 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t o  t hose  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e . U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  they 
sugges ted  . t h a t  "before  t h e  Depression c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  was a s  much p o l i t i c a l  
a s .  e co~orn i c ,  in tended  e q u a l l y  t o  b u i l d  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s -  and press 
p o l i t i c a l  demands and t o  e l e v a t e  t he  s tandard  of l i v i n g  by p r e s s u r i n g  
i n d i v i d u a l  employers." "Then dur ing  t h e  Depression,"  they  con t inue ,  
2 2 
" the  North American working c l a s s e s  succeeded t o  p o l i t i c a l  power. The 1930s 
meant i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h e  worker e n t r y  t o  t h e  p o l i t y ,  a s  p a r t  of a  c o a l i t i o n  
of fa rmers  ind  e t h n i c  groups. But s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  d i d  n o t  w i the r  away i n  t h e  
un i t ed  s t a t e s ,  a s  it d i d  i n  no r the rn  Europe a f t e r  a s i m i l a r  e n t r y .  Why?" 
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I n  c o n t r a s t  t o .  no r the rn  Europe, they  s u g g e s t ,  "al though American l a b o r  t r i e d  
hard du r ing  t h e  ' late t h i r t i e s  t o  o b v i a t e  t h e  . s t r i k e  through government i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i n  l a b o r  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  weight of h i s t o r i c  t r a d i t i o n s  of non- in te rvent ion ,  p l u s  
t h e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  o r  oppos i t i on  of o t h e r  members of t h e  p o l i t y ,  doomed these  e f f o r t s  
t o  f a i l u r e .  F i n a l l y ,  American l abo r  r econc i l ed  i t s e l f  t o  a  w a t e r t i g h t  d i v i s i o n  
betereen job  a c t i o n ,  where t h e  mechanisms of f r e e  c o l l e c t i v e  ba rga in ing  were t o  
f u n c t i o n  unobs t ruc ted  by gbvernment i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  and . p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n ,  which was 
t o  be executed through i n t e r e s t - c o a l i t i o n . p o l i t i c a 1  pa r t i e s . " . 24  Shor t e r  and T i l l y  
o f f e r  no newev idence  -- q u a l i t a t i v e  o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e -  -- f o r  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
bu t  l a y  i t  down a-s a  p roposa l  f o r  f u t u r e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
' ~ d w ~ r d s ,  then., t akes  .up t h e  proposa l .  H e  concludes t h a t  such a n '  
. . 
organiiatipnal-political argument does n o t  work. . \ h a t  are h i s  grounds? . 
I# 
"Economic f a c t o r s , "  w r i t e s  Edwards, a r e  common t o  a l l  s t r i k e s ;  bu t  p o l i t i c a l  
ones a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have an  impact which i s  . l i m i t e d  t o  a  smal l  range of s t r i k e s . "  
. . 25 
He cont inues :  ".Instead of concen t r a t ing  on a  supposed p o l i t i q a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  among 
workers . .  . . one shouldexamine  t h e  . r o l e  of t he  government and. i t s  d e c i s i o n . o f  
? 
when t o  i n t e rvene  i n  l a b o r  d i s p u t e s . "  ' " P o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s , "  i t ' a p p e a r s ,  mean . . 
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. . 
.. t h e  e x p l i c i t  i nco rpora t ion  qf demands concerning the .  n a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  df power-, 
o r  t h e  d i r e c t  i n t k r J e n t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  i n  t h e  course  of a s t r i k e .  
Those a r e ,  indeed, r a r e  even t s .  .But  they  do no t  exhaust  t h e  p ~ l i t i c a l ~ c o n t e x t  
. .  . 
and s i g n i f i c a n c e  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t .  A f a c t o r y  occupat ion movement can sweep 
a  country w h i l e . t h e  . . bu lk  of workersl 'demands concen t r a t e  on wages, working 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  and j o b  s e c u r i t y .  S t r i k e  waves h a v e  fa r - reaching  p o l i t i c a l  imp l i ca t ions ,  
I 
t n v a r i a b l y  a t  t r a c t  . s i g n i f i c a n t  governmental i n t e r v e n t i o n , .  and depend, among - o t h e r  
t h i n g s ,  on workers '  r ead ings  of t he  l i k e l y  c h a r a c t e r  of t h a t  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
Idhat evidence does Edwards o f f e r  on t h e s e  ma t t e r s?  H e  r e s t s  h i s  c a s e  
wi th  two r eg res s ion  equa t ions ,  f o r  t h e  pe r iods  1900-1939 and 1946-1972. I n  
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those  equat ione ,  p a r t y  of p r e s i d e n t  and pe rcen t  vo t ing  Democratic a r e  t he  proposed 
p o l i t ' i c a l  measures, and s t r i k e  frequency i s  t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e .  Once aga in ,  
we must a s k  the  two i n s i s t e n t  ques t ions :  I h y  t h e s e  pe r iods ,  and no o t h e r s ?  Why 
. . n o t  look  a t  o the r  ' f k a t u r e s  of s t r i k e s ?  I n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  we must a l s o  ponder 
' 
, t h e  adequacy. o f '  Edwards' measures of p o l i t i c a l  ~ h a n . ~ e ;  they  c e r t a i n l y  s tand  some 
d i s t a n c e  from the. , p o r t r a y a l  of p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e  Shor t e r -T i l l y  account .  Indeed, 
. . 
they do n o t . e v e n  r ep resen t  Edwardsf own c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of a  p o l i t i c a l  account.  
. . 
These.seem' t h i n  grounds f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  p o l i t i c s  from s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y .  
An "Industrial" Relations Interpretation" of .Strikes - 
. . 
In arguing first against economic factors and then against.politica1 
fac.fors, ~dwards narrows the available explanatory ground considerably. American 
. . strikes, in his view,' can best be understood in terms of institutional arrangements. 
. . - .  ? 
In particular, he claims, the bargaining structure makes a difference. "Collective 
bargaining -- rather than economic or political'factors -- remains the centre of 
attention, " he maintains. 28. A country's bargaining stru~tur~ can best explain 
. . 
prevailing patterns. of s trfkes: their f req'uency , 'duration, and size. 
Edwards has a point. Bargaining structure can go.a.long way toward '. 
. . 
explaining prevailfng patterns,of strikes,. even in countri-es traditfonally 
. . 
thought to have poorly-institutionalized industrial. relations. To draw an 
2 9 -  i I 
example from Italy, the two-level' bargaining prevailing during the 19.70s 
. . 
deeply affected strike patterns, Industry-wide collective agreements,.renewed 
. . . . 
every three years, are u~~derscored by a few large, demonstrative- strikes. At 
this level, sZze is 'the characteristi'c dimension; the workers of'a whole industry 
go on stri'ke for the renewal of thefr collective contract. Rfght after the signing 
of the industry-wid6 contract, however, plant-level bargaining opens, in order to 
catch productivity differentials among firms within the industry. Then hundreds 
of firms throughout the country renew their plant contracts. At this level, 
. frequency- Zs the .characteristic -dimension. ~uantitativel~, strike size and 
frequency describe two out-of~phase sine waves with periods of three years and 
an average phase-lag of one year, as a consequence of Italy's specific 
arrangements for bargaining.' 
30 
yet.ltalyts bargaining structure can hardly-be taken as an explanation in. 
' 
. . 
this case, in'd. bargainfng structure can only serve as a.short-run explanation . 
i n  general . ,  F i r s t ,  a s  Walter Korpi has  argued,  t h e  emergence of a given . . . 
ba rga in ing  s t ruc t ' u r e  i s  i t s e l f ' t h e  r e s u l t  o f ' c o n f l i c t ,  a  f u n c t i o n  of changes i n  
t h e . b a l a n c e  of power between workers and ehp loye r s  3 i  While, then ,  a  given 
,barga in ing  s t r u c t u r e ,  once.Yn e x i s t e n c e ,  a f f e c t s  t h e  p a t t e r n o f  s t r i k e s ,  " the  
! 
s t r u c t u r e  - ' [ i t s e l f  1 .  r e f l e c t s  t h e .  c o n f l i c t s  on .which i t  was b u i l t " ,  a s  Edwards 
himself recognizes  32 : To fo l low up on our  I t a l i a n  example, t h e  increased  . 
. . d e c e n t r a l f z a t i o n  of ba rga in ing  l e v e l s  i n  . t h e  postwar pe r iod  was brought about  
through c o n f l i c t .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s, a s  a  r e s u l t  of i nc reased  l a b o r  u n r e s t ,  
industry-wide ba rga in ing  came t o  p a r a l l e l ,  -- n o t  wi thout  much r e s i s t a n c e  from 
employers -- n a t i o n a l ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  bargainirig t h a t  had - u n t i l  then been exclusi i re .  
Again, p l a n t - l e v e l  ba rga in ing  only  gained r e c o g n i t i o n  du r ing  t h e  wave of s t r i k e s  
- I 
t h a t  swept I t a l y  du r ing  t h e  l a t e  1 9 6 0 ~ ~ ~  
Second, t h e  ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e  on ly  h e l p s  e x p l a i n  some of t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of s t r i k e s :  why s t r i k e s  a r e  s h o r t e r  o r  longer  i n  some i n s t i t u -  
t i o n a l  s e t t i n g s  r a t h e r  than o t h e r s ,  why they a r e  more o r  less f r equen t ,  more o r  
l e s s  l a r g e .  It a l s o  he lps  e x p l a i n  some of t h e  over-time behavior  of s t r i k e s :  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c y c l i c a l  and p e r i o d i c  movements i n '  s t r i k e  dimensions ( s i z e ,  
f requency,  and d u r a t i o n )  and t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s .  
Thete  a r e ,  however, o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  f o r  which a n  
i n s t i t u t 2 o n a l  kxp lana t ion  has  much l e s s  t o  o f f e r .  S t r i k e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a l s o  
show s h q r t  and medium term f luc tua t ions . .  They a r e  b e t t e r  explained i n  terms 
of t h e  bus ines s  c y c l e .  To be more e x a c t ,  t h e  ba rga in ing  p o s i t i o n s  of workers 
, and managers va ry  w i th  some r e g u l a r i t y  through t h e  bus ines s  c y c l e ,  a n d . t h e r e f o r e  
produce r e g u l a r . v a r i a t i o n s  i n  ' the f r equenc i e s ,  forms, and outcomes of s t r i k e s .  
* 
Edwards h3mself admits '  a s  much, with a  good deal. of ambivalence 
3 4 .  
There i s  no r ea son ,  however, . why ecknoniic and ins . t i tu t ion 'a1  ef  f  e c t b  
.. . 
cannot  'be combined. t o  o f f e r  complementary exp lana t ions  of d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  
. . . . 
of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y . ,  Re l iance  on one exp lana to ry  f a c t o r  (such a s  t h e  barga in ing  
L . s t r u c t u r e )  t o  t h e  exc lus ion  of o t h e r s  (such a s  economic and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s )  
? . . 
may be q u i t e  misleading.  In s t ead  of c o n t e s t s  t o  t h e  d e a t h ,  we need i n t e g r a t i o n  
, - 
8 m o n g . a l t e r n a t i v e  exp lana t ions  and' models t h a t  have proved t o  be s u c c e s s f u l  
w i t h i n  p a r t i c u l a r ' d o m a i n s .  Korpi,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  ha s  shown convinc ingly  how 
. economic. ha rdsh ip ,  r e l a t i v e  d e p r i v a t i o n  . . o r ,  more g e n e r a l l y ,  economic f a c t o r s  
can be i nco rpo ra t ed  . . i n  a balance-o'f-power model , Edwards' work does j u s t i c e  
. 35 
'to a  f a c t o r  -- barga in ing  s t r u c t u r e . - - .  o f t e n  neg lec t ed  by t h e o r i s t s  of  p r o t e s t  
and power s t r u g g l e .  But i n  c a l l i n g  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h a t  f a c t o r  he has  b l inded  
. I 
himself  t o  t h e  i n s i g h t s ' o f  compefing t h e o r e t i c a l  approaches.  
Job Cont ro l  and American Labor 
I f  a  c o u n t r y ' s  " s t r i k e  p a t t e r n  undoubtedly r e f l e c t .  a s p e c t s  of  i t s  
c o l l e c t i v e  barga in ing  arrangements",  t h e  key v a r i a b l e  i s  r e a l l y  job  c o n t r o l  
o r , . b e t t e r ,  " t h e  i n t e n s i t y  of s t r u g g l e  f o r  control . ,"36 It i s . j o b  c o n t r o l ,  
accord ing  t o  Edwards;that p rovides  t h e  running  th read ,  t h e  un i fy ing  f o r c e  
t h a t  'can e x p l a i n  both t h e  unchanging shape of ~ m e r i c a n  s t r i k e s  over  t h e  l a s t  
c en tu ry  and t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  America. The 
. . 
. . 
vkry  'emergence of such a  decen t r a l i zed -  ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e  t hus  " r e f l e c t s  t h e  
.. previous .  s t r u g g l e  ' f o r  c o n t r o l .  "   he ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e ,  wi th  i t s  emphasis 
. . 3 7 
. . 
. . .on p l a n t - l e v e l  ba rga in ing  and j o b - c ' o n t r o l ' i s s u e s , -  t h e r e f o r e  r e p r e s e n t s  o.nly 
t h e  c r y s - t a l l i z a t i o n  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i d n  o f  p rev ious  s t r u g g l e s  over  job 
control . .  ' What ~ d w a r d s  o ' f f e r s  a s  an exp lana t ion  .at one' p o i n t  becomes t h e  ' . 
answer a t .  ano the r .  We. come f u l l  c i r c l e .  
. Thi s  c i r c l i n g  between job c o n t r o l  and ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e  c a l l s  f o r  
. . 
. .  , t i ~ b  obse rva t ions .  F i r s t ,  some comments on t h e  meaning of "job c o n t r o l "  and 
s t r u g g l e s  over  ~ o n t r o l , "  w r i t e s  Anthony Giddens, ' ' job c o n t r o l  s t r u g g l e s .  " '  '' 
" a re  ' p o l i t i c a l '  s t r u g g l e s  -- us ing  t h i s  term i n  a  ve ry  broad sense -- s i n c e  
I 
they n e c e s s a r i l y  involve  a t t empt s  on the  p a r t  of working-class a s s o c i a t i o n s  
t o  a c q u i r e  an in f luence  ove r ,  o r  i n  t h e  most r a d i c a l  con tex t  t o  ga in  f u l l  
c o n t r o l  ove r ,  the"governmentt of i ndus t ry . "  I f  s o ,  e i t h e r  Edwards i s  . . 
35 . . 
' wrong t o  r e j e c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  o r . h e  has  i n  
mind more than one meaning of job c o n t r o l .  
The Four teenth  Resolu t ion  adopted a t  t h e  Third Congress of t he  
Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l  (1921) provides  one p o s s i b l e  meaning of "job 
c o n t r o l t t  pnd "workers' cont ro l" :  
. h l l  of t h e  economic s t r u g g l e s  of t h e  working c l a s s  should c e n t e r  
, around t h e  s logan of , t h e  p a r t y  'Workers ' Contro l  Over Product ion.  .39 
I n  , t h i s -  f i r s t  sense ,  "job c o n t r o l "  r e p r e s e n t s  a  f i r s t  s t e p  toward t h e  
achievement of. 'working-class p o l i t i c a l  power. Edwards, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
u ses  t h e  express ion  "job con t ro l "  t o  . 'mean . t h e  worker ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  
h i s  immediate work environment and t a s k s ,  t o  c r e a t e  o r  main ta in  a n i che  
of autonomy wi th in  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r .  Michael Mann c a l l s  t h i s  
second form of c o n t r o l  "defens ive  c o n t r o l , "  even i f  i t  involves  some p a r t i a l  
. . 
encroachment upon marginal  managerial  p rerogat , ives  4 0 The .more r a d i c a l  form 
pf c o n t r o l ;  on t h e  o the r  hand, . . i n v o l v e s  " the .  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a l t e r i n g  e x i s t i n g .  
h i e r a r c h i e s  o f . a u t h o r i t y  w i t h i n ' t h e  e n t e r p r i ~ e . ' ; ~  
This  d i s t i n c t i o n  i:n t h e  meanfng of "cont ro l"  b r i n g s  us  t o  t h e  . second . 
. . p o i n t .  To quote 'Ciddens aga in ,  "Any s o r t  of major ex t ens ion  of i n d u s t r i a l  
. . . . 
c o n f l i c t  . . . t n to .  t h e  a r e a  of ' c o n t r o l  poses  a  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  o£.economic and p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  which i s  a  fundamental b a s i s  
. ' .  of the c a p i t a l ~ s t  s t a t e  . . . because t t  s e r v e s  t o  b r i n g . i n t o  t h e  open the  
t connect ions between pol3:ti 'cal power i'n the  p o l i t y  a s  such,  and the  broader 
' p d l i t i c a l '  subord inht ion  of t h e  working ' ; lass wi-'thin t h e  economfc o rde r .  '.' 
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Now do these  a b s t r a c t  s ta tements  apply t o  Ameri'can experfence? - 0 n . t h e  one 
hand, American c a p i t a l i s t s ,  wi'th t h e  a i d  of government, kep t  American l abo r  
from tak ing  a  c e n t r a l i z e d ,  p o l i t i c a l  s t ance  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  l i k e  i t s  
European coun te rpa r t s .  On t h e  o t h e r ,  managers prevented  "control!' i s s u e s  a t  
the  p l a n t  l e v e l  from t ak ing  a  more r a d i c a l  t u r n .  A good example from Edwards' 
own a n a l y s i s  i s  management's d e f l e c t i o n  of workers '  demands f o r  d i s c l o s u r e  of 
company p k o f i t s  
'4 3 
This  was t h e  l o s t  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e  of American workers. 
It does no t  mean they f a2 led  t o  f i g h t .  One has  only  t o  read  Brecher 's  n a r r a t i v e  
of major American f i g h t s  t o  l e a r n  the  con t r a ry  4 4 American workers t r i e d  hard ,  
w l t l i  some of t h e  most v i o l e n t ,  6100dy, and b i t t e r  c l a s h e s  i n  t h e  western world. 
. . 
The d f f f e r e n c e ' f r o m  t h e  European exper2ence i s  . t h a t  they l o s t  even more 
emphat ical ly  t h a n ' t h e i r  European f e l lows .  
This  a b i l i t y  t o  maintain the  s e p a r a t i o n  between "economic" and " p o l i t i c a l "  
c o n f l i c t ;  t o  prevent  t he  " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of s t r i k e  ac t ion"  4 5 
t o  . l i m i t  ind-ustr i .a l  c o n f l i c t  t o  job-control. 2ssues and p l an t - l eve l  b a r g a i n h g ,  
. ,  
t o  block the. express.i'on of working-class i s s u e s  i n  ' n a t i o n a l  class-wtde bargai'ning 
. . . . 
c o n s t i t u t e s  t be  g r e a t  p o l t t i c a l .  ~ i . c  to ry  .of American c a p i t a l i s m .  I t  has- so  f a r  
succeeded i n  'mai'ntaini'ng a  divi'ded ,work3ng c l a s s ,  fragmented i n  t h e  pursuf t 
. of corpora . .t i.s t p l an t - l eve l  economi.sm. The. meaning o;f such an  ongoing s t r u g g l e  
. 
l-s e s s e n t i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l . ,  It concerns power, l o c a l  and n a t i o n a l .  That i s  t r u e  
r e g a r d l e s s . o f  whether a  r eg re s s ion  equafton r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  a l t e r n a t i o n  of 
par t i 'es  i n  power cap tu re s  t he  s t r u g g l e .  . I t  h e l p s  u s  t o  understand t h e . i n s t f t u -  
. t i o n a l 2 z a t i o n  t h a t  took p l ace  2n the 1930s. A s  Michael Mann ' w r i t e s ,  '"What we c a l l  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a 1 i z a t i o ' ; I  of ' i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  i's no th ing  more no r  l e s s  than 
t h e  narrowing down of c o n f l i c t  t o  a g g r e s s i t e  economism and de fens ive  c o n t r o l . "  
. . 
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- . I n  seek ing  t o  cha l l enge  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l - p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
.of s t r z k e  a c t i v i t y , - t h e n ,  Edwards b r ings  u s ' t o  ba rga in ing  s t r u c t u r e s  and- job 
! 
c o n t r o l .  -But barga in ing  s t r u c t u r e s  and job  c o n t r o l  r e s t  on a  web of -organiza t ion  
. . 
and p o l i t i c s , .  of organized s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power. Desp i t e  h imse l f ,  Edwards '. 
. . 
p o i n t s  ' co r r ed t ly  t o  t h e  next  round of  work on i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t :  t o  abandon 
. . . . 
, :  t h e  f r u i t ' l e s s - o p p o s i t i o n  of "economic", " p o l i t i c a l "  and " i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s "  
v a r f a b l e s ,  and  t o  s e e  s t r i k e s  a s .  s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power over  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  and 
r e t u r n s  of work. I n  t h a t  s ense ,  Edwards t a k e s  u s  back t o  t h e  agenda i m i l i c i t  
i n  John R .  Commons"old i n s i g h t s  i n t o  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t .  
I 
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